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Prevention of Improper Securities
Transactions by Employees: The Respon-
sibility for and Feasibility of Adopting
Preventative Programs
By BRUCE ALAN MANN*
S INCE the decision in the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. case,1 num-
erous articles have been written emphasizing the potential liability of
corporate directors for acts of employees who violate the federal securi-
ties laws2 and the degree of protection afforded directors against per-
sonal liability for such violations by liability insurance.3 Although the
desirability of preventative programs aimed at avoiding either inten-
tional or inadvertent securities law violations by employees has been
frequently discussed,4 few authors have attempted to delineate the va-
* B.B.A. 1955 and J.D. 1957, University of Wisconsin; Member, California
Bar. The author is grateful to Nicholas Budd, B.A. 1967, University of California
(Berkeley), J.D. 1970, University of Califorma (Los Angeles), Member, California
Bar, for assistance in preparing this article.
1. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972). In this landmark decision the court held, inter alia, that
issuance of a negligently drafted press release constituted a violation of Rule lOb-5 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh-1 (1970) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Exchange Act].
2. General discussions of the standard of care required of directors under fed-
eral securities law may be found m Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities
of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus. LAw. 817, 826-28 (1965); Morrson, Factors that
Limit the Negligence Liability of a Corporate Executive or Director, 10 CoaR. PRAc.
CoMmENT. 201 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Momson]; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par Delicto, Indem-
nification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
3. E.g., Insuring Corporate Personnel, ALI-ABA Course of Study Transcript
No. 3 (1970); Hinsey & DeLancey, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance-An
Approach to its Evaluation and a Checklist, 23 Bus. LAw. 869 (1968); Note, Liability
Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HAMI. L. REV. 648 (1967).
4. E.g. Ruder, A Suggestion for Increased Use of Corporate Law Departments in
Modern Corporations, 23 Bus. LAw. 341, 346-49 (1968); Address by Arthur Fleischer,
Jr., symposium on Insider Trading m Stocks, Nov. 22, 1965, reprinted in 21 Bus. LAw.
1009, 1019-20 (1966).
[355]
riety of preventative programs or to comment on the practicality of
their implementation.5 Such will be the function of this article.
This discussion first will analyze the reasons why preventative pro-
grams are considered, then will consider the risk of liability to directors
for improper securities transactions by corporate employees, the criteria
for evaluating preventative programs, and finally the advantages and
disadvantages of the most frequently considered programs. Basically,
then, this article focuses on the practical ramifications of various pre-
ventative programs specifically designed to curtail improper or illegal
securities transactions by corporate employees. Although compliance
programs which may be instituted to prevent other improper or illegal
conduct, such as antitrust law violations,6 are not within the purview
of this article, many considerations and problems are relevant to all
preventative programs without regard to their specific purpose. Thus,
in considering whether to implement programs to prevent improper se-
curities transactions, any experience of the corporation in implement-
ing other preventative programs should be analyzed.
It is well established that an employee who trades on inside
information violates both Rule 10b-5 7 under the Securities Exchange
5. The general technique for a legal audit is discussed in Brown, Legal Audit,
38 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1965). Several programs which may be implemented to pre-
vent insider trading at a time when it is inappropriate are discussed in New York Stock
Exchange Co. Manual, § A-2, Part III (June 10, 1971) [hereinafter cited as NYSE
Manual]. See also Shutter, Disclosure Information: Limitation on Directors' Purchase
and Sale of Bank's Stock and Conflicts of Interest, 55 J. COMM. BANK LENDING, Oct.,
1972, at 36, 40. Utilization of director's policy resolutions and memoranda outlining
legal responsibilities are discussed in Johnston, Developing a Protection Program for
Corporate Directors and Officers, 26 Bus. LAw. 445 (1970) and Watt, Formalizing the
Corporate Policy and Minimizing Exposure to Conflicts of Interest, 17 Bus. LAw. 42
(1961).
6. See, e.g., Van Cise, How to Live With Antitrust, 40 HARv. Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec., 1962, at 119; Withrow, The Antitrust Laws and Corporate Personnel: What
Type of Educational Program is Needed, 4 CORP PRAC. COMMENT. 1 (1962); With-
row, Making Compliance Programs Work, 7 ANTITRUsT BULL. 607 (1962); Whiting,
Antitrust and the Corporate Executive II, 48 VA. L. REV. 1 (1962).
7 This rule provides: "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. It
shall be unlawful for any person, directlv or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240, 10b-5 (1973).
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Act of 19348 [Exchange Act] and state law and that such improper
trading may result in liability to the person with whom the employee
deals or to the corporation.9 A discussion of the parameters of Rule
IOb-5 liability is beyond the scope of this article,"0 since preventative pro-
grams are designed to proscribe activities which may be, or may appear
to be, improper and not to determine whether particular conduct is
illegal or what sanctions should be imposed once conduct is established
to be illegal.
Why Should Preventative Programs Be Considered?
At the outset, it is necessary to analyze the reasons which may
motivate a board of directors to implement programs designed to pre-
vent securities law violations by corporate employees.
Foremost among these reasons is the concern that the duty of
the board to supervise management and corporate affairs also en-
compasses a duty to prevent improper conduct. Under section 20 (a)"
of the Exchange Act directors may be held personally liable for vio-
lations of Rule 10b-5 by the corporation and its employees, if the
directors in some way control the violators' 2 and have not acted in
good faith. It has frequently been assumed that acting in good faith
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970). Herein referred to as the Exchange Act.
9. With respect to liability under the Exchange Act, see note 30 and accom-
panying test infra. With respect to employee liability under state law, see Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). The principle
that under state law a "tippee" may be held liable to the corporation for profits re-
sulting from the use of inside information despite the lack of a direct fiduciary relation-
ship was adopted in Schem v. Chasan, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for
cert. filed sub. nora., Lehman Bros. v. Schem, 42 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept 18, 1973)
(No. 73-439).
10. Not only are the parameters of Rule 10b-5 constantly changing, but numerous
other articles have been written dealing with the types of securities transactions pro-
scribed by the rule. The factors which appear to influence courts in determining
whether particular conduct violates Rule lOb-5 are discussed in Mann, Rule 10b-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970). The difficulty inherent m attempts to define
the scope of the Rule is discussed m Painter, Rule lOb-5: The Recodification Thicket,
45 ST. JoHN's L Rnv. 699 (1971).
11. This section provides: "Liabilities of controlling persons. (a) Every person
who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
12. See notes 59-69 and accompanying text infra. The problem of determin-
ing the meaning of control is discussed in Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C.,
21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966).
does not require the implementation of preventative programs. How-
ever, recent decisions have indicated that the good faith defense re-
quires more than an ostrich-head-m-the-sand approach and that "the
[controlling person must] show that some precautionary measures were
taken to prevent the injury suffered "13 Taking little comfort
from the fact that outside directors seem to be held to a lower standard
in establishing the good faith defense,' 4 business publications have
emphasized the potential liability of the outside director who is ap-
parently innocent of any intentional wrong-domg.15
A second reason for considering preventative programs is the di-
rectors' legitimate desire to prevent occurrences which, even if legal,
would adversely reflect on the corporation, its directors or manage-
ment.16 Even the rumor that the Securities and Exchange Commission
[SEC] is investigating transactions in a company's securities can have
a dramatic, adverse impact on the market price. In addition, transac-
tions by officers and directors in the corporation's securities must be
made public 17 which can result in embarrassing questions from the
13. S.E.C. v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1972), quoting
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966). But see note 74 and
accompanying text infra.
14. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). In considering the
legal obligations of corporate fiduciaries it is generally assumed that "[a] higher standard
of conduct is generally imposed on a person who is more active in the operation of the
business." Jacobs, Business Ethics and the Law: Obligations of a Corporate Executive,
28 Bus. LAw 1063, 1065 (1973).
15. Referring to "a rising tide of lawsuits by disgruntled stockholders" one com-
mentator noted that "a corporation need hardly breathe bad news before its directors
find themselves hit." Vanderwicken, Change Invades the Boardroom, FORTUNE, May,
1972, at 156.
16. It has been argued that "[I]n the competition for investment capital, funds
tend to flow in the same direction as analyst interest and public confidence, and both
of these depend in large measure upon the corporation s commitment to full disclosure."
Feuerstem, SEC Restrictions on the Use of Inside Information, 37 FINANCIAL EXEcu-
TivE, Dec., 1969, at 16, 19. The validity of this argument was illustrated when the
common stock of Vetco Offshore Industries was suspended from trading on the
American Stock Exchange for five weeks while the SEC investigated transactions in the
stock. Although the company was an innocent victim and ultimately recovered a
"short swing profit" realized by the subject of the SEC investigation, the episode re-
sulted in the market price for its common stock dropping 50 percent. BARRON'S, Aug.
27, 1973, at 19, col. 2.
17 Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), requires that any
change m the beneficial ownership of a security listed on a national securities ex-
change or registered pursuant to Section 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970), of such
Act of an officer, director or beneficial holder of more than 10% of the class be re-
ported within 10 days after the close of the month in which it occurs. Reports of
changes of beneficial ownership are regularly published in the Wall Street Journal and,
if notable, are discussed under the caption "What 'Insiders' are Doing" in FNANcIAL
WORLD MAGAZINE,
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press' s and shareholders.
Directors have also considered adopting preventative programs to
avoid inadvertent violations of federal securities laws by employees.
Although directors and principal executive officers are generally aware
of their responsibility not to trade on inside information, to pass such
information on to their friends and associates, or to engage in other
transactions violative of the federal securities laws, lower-level employ-
ees such as secretaries and bookkeepers may not be cognizant of their
similar responsibility.
Preventative programs may also be adopted in the belief that the
act of implementing such programs manifests an intention to comply
with the federal securities laws. Consequently, if violations of securi-
ties laws should subsequently occur, implementation of a preventative
program hopefully will be viewed favorably by the staff of the commis-
sion in determining what sanctions should be sought or what penalties
should be imposed. Frequently preventative programs are not imple-
mented until after a violation has occurred, at which time such pro-
grams may become part of the terms of settlement."9 However, the
implementation of preventative programs prior to any violations may
have a material effect on the outcome of any effort by the SEC to
obtain a permanent injunction against the violator."0
18. Two officials of Occidental Petroleum Corp. were questioned and named by
the Wall Street Journal m a lead article on trading on inside information. The
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1972, at 2, col. 6. Both officers had purchased shortly
before the announcement of a materially favorable corporate development, but claimed
to have legitimate reasons for their purchases and no knowledge of the impending
development Id. at 28, col. 3. Similar criticism arose as a result of sales by Equity
Funding executives shortly before announcement of unfavorable news regarding that
company. Id. April 20, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
19. See, e.g., In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. Sc. L. REP. 77,629, at 83,347, where Merrill, Lynch's underwriting division was
charged by the SEC with disclosing to personnel involved in institutional sales for
the firm information obtained in the course of preparing a registration statement which
was disclosed to selected customers prior to public dissemination. The Commission
accepted an offer of settlement which included an undertaking to implement extensive
provisions designed to prevent future disclosure by the underwriting division of such
information to other employees of the firm. The Commission stated that "In deter-
mining to accept the offer of settlement submitted by respondents we have taken into
consideration registrants undertaking to adopt, implement, and ensure compliance
with [the proposed preventative program]." Id. at 83,350. In SEC v. Lums, Inc.,
[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 94,134, at 94,555 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the
court refused to hold a broker-dealer liable for the violation of Rule 10b-5 by its em-
ployee salesman because the broker-dealer had demonstrated that it not only did not
induce the salesman's breach but that it had demonstrated its good faith by having a
comprehensive compliance program designed to prevent improper employee conducL
A further reason for implementing preventative programs, partic-
ularly m large multidivisional corporations, is a desire to establish
standards for executive conduct which will be applied uniformly within
the corporate structure, rather than permitting standards to vary from
division to division. Uniform standards would appear especially desir-
able where the executives of the corporation and its subsidiaries do
not present all questions involving securities transactions to the same
legal counsel.
Finally, the view favoring the adoption of preventative programs
and establishment of standards of conduct for corporate employees who
deal in their employer's securities is a reflection of changing attitudes
toward insider trading. Tis change results from an increased aware-
ness that those who trade on inside information may expose themselves
and the corporation to civil liability,21 and that the time and expense
devoted to nonproductive litigation can be reduced by the establish-
ment of programs designed to prevent potentially unlawful acts.
20. In SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W 3215 (Oct.
15, 1973), the court refused to issue a permanent injunction because it found that
the SEC had "failed to carry its burden to establish, with persuasive evidence, that
Bangor Punta, its officers, directors and employees have a propensity or natural in-
clination to violate the securities law." 331 F Supp. at 1163. The Second Cir-
cuit upheld the denial of the injunction, but in dissent Judge Timbers insisted
that the district court applied the wrong standard in deciding whether an in-
junction should issue. "It has uniformly been held that the correct standard is
'whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated.'" 480
F.2d at 385. Judge Timbers argued that the requirement of showing "a propensity
or natural inclination to violate the securities law" placed a greater burden on the
SEC, specifically by requiring proof of an intent to violate those laws. Id. at
385-86. Judge Mansfield, concurring with Judge Gurlem, rejected the proposition that
the slight difference between the standards demanded reversal, characterzing the
dissent's contention as "petty semanticism." Id. at 405. To the extent that there is a
real difference between the standards, it could be argued that the implementation of a
program to prevent a particular wrong from recurring would satisfy the standard in-
sisted upon by Judge Timbers, but not the standard applied by the district court. In
SEC v. Lum's Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FaD. SEC. L. Rmi, 19,134, at 94,555
(S.D.N.Y 1973) the district court permanently enjoined the issuer from violations of
Rule lOb-5, despite the fact that the corporation had subsequently implemented a policing
program. The court found the precautions "inadequate" in view of prior leaks of cor-
porate information, and directed the corporation to "establish written guidelines for the
dissemination of corporate information to the investment community." Id. at 94,569.
On the other hand, implementation of an appropriate preventative program prior to any
wrong-doing may tend to negate the existence of a propensity or natural inclination to
violate the securities laws.
21. Prior to the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision approximately 1,700 subscribers
to the Harvard Business Review were asked what they would do if they learned that
their company was about to merge with a smaller company whose stock was certain to
rise when the news of the merger became public. 42% indicated that they would buy
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
January 1974] SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BY EMPLOYEES 361
On What Theories May Directors Be Held Liable for
the Failure to Implement Preventative Programs?
A major consideration of directors in deciding whether any pro-
gram should be implemented is the risk that they may be held person-
ally liable for any improper trading in the corporation's securities. A
variety of legal theories have been advanced for holding directors re-
sponsible for failing to take preventative steps against such acts. 2a
Failure to Supervise
While it is the officers of the corporation and not the directors
who are traditionally charged with responsibility for day-to-day opera-
tions,28 directors are under a duty to supervise the activities of officers
and other employees and to establish the overall policies of the corpora-
tion.24  Where corporate losses2 5 are attributable to the directors' negli-
gent2" failure to supervise the conduct of persons in charge of corporate
for themselves, 14% would tell a friend and 2% would tell a broker. Bumhart, How
Ethical are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REv. July-Aug., 1961, at 6, 16. Although no
comparable survey has been published recently, the author believes a significant change
m attitudes has occurred. The effect of the SEC attack on traditional attitudes of in-
siders has been described as "stirrng up trouble and confusion among corporate execu-
tives and people in the securities business." New Rules on "Insuders"--The Word from
Those Affected, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 16, 1968, at 94.
22. The present discussion is limited to liabilities arising from the trading m
the employers' securities. Liabilities may also arise as a result of trading in the se-
curities of other entities, typically where the corporation is involved m the securities
brokerage or investment business. See, e.g., Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973), [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f
79,378, at 83,100; i re Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FD. SEC. L. REP.
1 78-163, at 80,514; In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. f 77,629, at 83,347.
23. W. KNEPPER, LunIrTY OF CORPORATE OFFIcERs AND DmcroRs 82 (2d ed
1973) [hereinafter cited as KNuPER]; Morrison, supra note 2, at 203. See also
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. 3 W FLETCHER, PRivATE CORPORATIONs §§ 1070-71, at 671-82 (rev. ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; KNEPPER, supra note 23. But see Dyson, The Director's
Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 345 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dyson].
25. KNEPPER, supra note 23, at 14-15. See Heit v. Bixby, 276 F Supp. 217, 226
(E.D. Mo. 1967).
26. In general, the conduct of a corporate director is measured by the "due care"
or negligence standard. See, e.g., H. BALLANTnE, BALLANTIsE ON CORPOATIONS §§ 62-
67 (Rev. ed. 1946); KNEPPER, supra note 23, at 1-3; Dyson, supra note 24, at 371-76;
Morrison, supra note 2, at 202. In some jurisdictions the standard is expressed in
terms of the care taken by the prudent man m the management of his own affairs,
and in others as the care taken by the ordinary prudent director. See, e.g., Adkins &
Jams, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus. LAw. 817, 817-
21 (1965). At least one commentator has expressed the opinion that the same results
are reached regardless of the terms in which these standards are expressed. Dyson,
supra note 24, at 344, 371. In some jurisdictions, the standard of care has been codi-
affairs, directors have been held liable to the corporation, its sharehold-
ers and, in some cases, its creditors. 7
What constitutes negligent supervision of corporate affairs is ordi-
narily a question of fact.28  No court has held board members per-
sonally liable for failure to take steps to prevent insider trading of the
corporation's securities. Possibly this omission is attributable to an
application of the principle that the degree of care required of directors
must be commensurate with the evil to be avoided.29 Specifically, the
"evil" must be measured by its potential impact on the corporation
and its shareholders rather than on the general public. In the con-
text of insider trading,"0 the "loss" to the corporation is the improper
use of a corporate asset, namely inside information, of utterly no value
to the corporation except as a vehicle for illegally trading in its own
stock.3 A further result is the loss of goodwill and prestige associated
with public revelation that the corporation's insiders were bilking the
public. 2 The somewhat intangible33 nature of these losses would
fied by statute. See, e.g., Israels, A New Look at Corporate Directorship, in I THE
CORPORATE GENERAL COUNSEL WORKSHOP 153, 155-56 (Practicing Law Institute 1969).
27 See generally Morrison, supra note 2, at 204-06.
28. Of course, a director would ordinarily have no defense m the event the rest
of the board was held to have been negligent where that director willfully failed to exer-
cise any judgment, for example, by habitually absenting himself from directors meet-
ings or delegating his decision-making function to others. See, e.g., Platt Corp. v. Platt,
42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Davis v. Walker, 170 Neb. 891,
104 N.W.2d 479 (1960); KNEPPER, supra note 23, at 84; Morrison, supra note 2, at 202.
29 See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
30. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 have been interpreted
by the courts to impose a fiduciary obligation on an "insider" to disclose to the pur-
chaser or seller of the security purchased or sold by him material facts affecting the
value of a security and known to him by virtue of his inside position. See, e.g., Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). The concept of an "insider,"
originally thought limited to the officers, directors and majority shareholders, has grown
to include any person having "such a relationship to the corporation that he had
access to information which should be used 'only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone.'" Ross v. Licht, 263 F Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y 1967),
quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) See also SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally Rapp & Loeb, Tippee
Liability and Rule lOb-5, 13 CORP. PRAC. COMMENT, Feb., 1972, at 374, 379-80. Recent
actions by the SEC have attempted to establish liability where no such relationship exists
between the "insider" and the issuer. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text infra.
31. If the information is material and not available to the public generally,
trades by the corporation in its own stock would constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5.
See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kennedy, Transactions
by a Corporation in Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAw 319 (1964).
32. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78, 82 (1969); accord, Shem v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
33. An interesting illustration of one of the few situations where disclosure of
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justify a lesser duty of directors than the duty to prevent, for example,
embezzlement of the corporation's funds.
On the other hand, notice of facts reasonably indicating that the
agents of a corporation are mismanaging its affairs seems to increase
a director's supervisory obligation significantly. In Briggs v. Spauld-
ing,34 the United States Supreme Court held that bank directors could
not be held liable for losses incurred as a result of officer mismanage-
ment, stating that "'[i]f nothing has come to [the directors'] knowl-
edge, to awaken suspicion of the fidelity of the president and cash-
ier, ordinary attention to the affairs of the institution is sufficient.' ,,35
The Court added, however, that "[i]f [the directors] become ac-
quainted with any fact calculated to put prudent men on their guard,
a degree of care commensurate with the evil to be avoided is required,
and a want of that care certainly makes them responsible." 6
Upon this doctrinal basis, a number of courts have held that di-
rectors must proceed with additional diligence in supervising corporate
officers and employees upon some warning of trouble. 7 The courts
have held directors responsible for failure to take affirmative corrective
action after notice that the president of a bank was investing in spec-
ulative enterpnses, 3 1 that an employee had been engaged in embezzle-
ment,3 9 that the bank was in critical financial condition,40 that expendi-
tures were being made without proper approval,41 that an appraiser
improper trading might have significant impact upon corporate affairs is provided by
the case of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind.
1968), all'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
34. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
35. Id. at 148, quoting Percy v. Millaudon, 10 La. (Martin) 32, 35 (1829).
36. Id., 10 La. (Martin) at 35-36.
37. See, e.g., DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1967); Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Mason, 115 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1940); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir.
1938); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 297 Ill. 555, 131 N.E. 103 (1921).
See also FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 1078, at 687-88; Dyson, supra note 24, at 345.
38. Rankm v. Cooper, 149 F 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1907).
39. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mason 115 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1940). The
board failed to determine the full extent of the loss at the time of discovery, and
failed to avoid a repetition of the loss by taking measures to insure that other em-
ployees could not use the same device m the future.
40. Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 4 S.W.2d 938 (1928); Prudential Trust
Co. v. Brown, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930).
41. Tn-Bullion Smelting & Dev. Co. v. Curtis, 186 App. Div. 613, 174 N.Y.S. 830
(1919), afl'd sub. nom. mem, Tn-Bullion Smelting & Dev. Co. v. Corliss, 230 N.Y. 629,
130 N.E. 921 (1921).
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of collateral for loans made by the company had been implicated in
losses suffered in previous loans,42 that an employee was living beyond
his apparent means and had been accused of counterfeiting, 43 and that
the management of a company from which the corporation was consid-
ering the purchase of stock has been the object of complaints.44
Generally, absent any indications of unusual conduct, the imple-
mentation of reasonable corporate activity review procedures will tend
to insulate directors from responsibility for losses resulting from em-
ployee misconduct.4 5 In addition, their absence has been held to indi-
cate a lack of due care, particularly where the implementation of such
procedures is customary 46 However, the few courts which have sought
to delineate the extent of the programs required have emphasized that
directors are entitled to rely upon the honesty of persons in daily con-
trol of corporate activities, absent special circumstances."7 Elaborating
on this point, the court in Graham v Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
held:
42. Loan Soc'y v. Eavenson, 248 Pa. 407, 94 A. 121 (1915).
43. Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 501 (1933).
44. DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967).
45. Cory Mann George Corp. v. Old, 23 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1928); Dresser v.
Bates, 250 F 525 (1st Cir. 1918), modified on other grounds, 251 U.S. 524 (1920);
Bynum v. Scott, 217 F 122 (E.D.N.C. 1914); Sternberg v. Blame, 179 Ark. 448, 17
S.W.2d 286 (1929); Ohlendorf v. Rathje, 230 Ill. App. 427 (1923).
46. A number of courts have indicated that the directors' failure to personally
examine the books of the corporation or adopt procedures to reveal misconduct, such as
the enlistment of independent auditors, is a strong indication of negligence. See, e.g.,
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mason, 115 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1940); Atherton v. Ander-
son, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1907);
Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 4 S.W.2d 938 (1928) (court found that failure to adopt
proper auditing procedures, in addition to constituting negligence, served to encourage
unlawful activity); Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 94 A. 995 (1915); Ventress v.
Wallace, III Miss. 357, 71 So. 636 (1916); Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396,
50 A. 120 (1901); Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 405 S.W.2d 577 (1964). The foregoing cases consider
the standard of care required of bank directors. Several courts have held that, because
of the nature of the institution, bank directors are held to a higher standard of care m
the management of corporate assets than directors of other corporations operated for
profit. See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938); Allied Freight-
ways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950); Greenfield Say. Bank v. Aber-
crombie, 211 Mass. 252, 97 N.E. 897 (1912); Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396,
50 A. 120 (1901); Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
See generally Annot, 25 A.L.R.3d 941 (1969).
47 See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1938); Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 67 Ill. App. 2d 315, 214 N.E.2d 612 (1966);
Trembert v. Mott, 271 Mich. 683, 697, 261 N.W 109, 114 (1935); Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 114 S.E.2d 321 (1960); FLETCHER, supra
note 24, § 1070, at 677
(Vol. 25
January 19741 SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BY EMPLOYEES
[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of
their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion
that something is wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then
liability of the directors might well follow, but absent cause for
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate
a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which
they have no reason to suspect exists.
48
Liability of Directors Under Rule 10b-5 for Failure to Supervise
Transactions by Employees in the Company's Securities
Plaintiffs have argued unsuccessfully that Rule lOb-5 requires di-
rectors to exercise due care to ensure that prospective purchasers of
the company's securities are fully informed of all material facts and
to investigate the conduct of persons actually engaged in the corpora-
tion's securities transactions. In Cohen v. Franchard Corp.49 and
Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,50 for example, the purchasers sought without
success to hold directors of the issuer liable for the negligent failure
to ascertain and disclose material misstatements in sales materials and
financial information furnished by corporate agents. These cases,
while arguably distinguishable from those involving insider trading,5 1
shed some light on the investigatory duties imposed on directors by
Rule lOb-5.
In Cohen the court rejected the notion that a director's negligent
failure to discover misconduct of his codirectors or corporate officers
makes the director liable to purchasers:
Appellants urge that we adopt a standard that failure to dis-
cover material facts when such facts could have been ascertained
48. 41 Del. ch. 78, 85, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The court was obvi-
ously concerned with the impracticability of broad supervision of the acts of minor
officials m large compames, stating: "The duties of the Allis-Chalmers Directors were
fixed by the nature of the enterprise which employed m excess of 30,000 persons, and
extended over a large geographical area. By force of necessity, the company's Di-
rectors could not know personally all the company's employees. The very magnitude of
the enterprise required them to confine their control to the broad policy decisions."
Id. See also Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938).
Since the definition of "insider" for purposes of Rule lOb-5 has been broadened to
include any employee who is m possession of material undisclosed information obtained
in the course of his employment, see note 30, supra, the rationale of the above-quoted
language in the Allis-Chalmers case would appear more persuasive where the trading
is conducted by "minor officials" than where it is conducted by co-directors or execu-
tive officers. See note 67 and accompanying text infra.
49. 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. In both cases material misrepresentations were alleged to have been made by
agents of the company on its behalf, rather than by insiders trading for their own ac-
counts. Secondly, the alleged liability was based upon the failure of the directors to
disclose material inside information to the purchasers, and only secondarily on the
failure of the directors to supervise the conduct of employees.
without inordinate effort is enough to establish a private action
under Rule 10b-5, "particularly where fiduciary relationships re-
quire attention." We decline the invitation.
52
In Lanza the court, sitting en bane, elaborated further on the same
theme:
We conclude that a director in his capacity as a director (a
non-participant in the transaction) owes no duty to insure that
all material, adverse information is conveyed to prospective pur-
chasers of the stock of the corporation on whose board he sits.
A director's liability to prospective purchasers under Rule 10b-5
can thus only be secondary, such as that of an aider and abettor,
a conspirator, or a substantial participant in fraud perpetrated by
others. 53
Significantly, the Eight, Ninth and Tenth circuits have approved,
at least in dicta, a finding in other contexts of Rule 10b-5 liability
for negligent conduct.54 However, as Professor Ruder has pointed out,
whatever the rationale behind the elimination of the scienter require-
ment for holding persons primarily liable under Rule 10b-5, the negli-
gence standard seems clearly inappropriate for holding unknowing
nonparticipants liable for their negligent failure to uncover and disclose
the truth.55
Liability of Directors as "Controlling Persons"
Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts
Both section 15 of the Securities Act of 193356 [Securities Act]
and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act5 ' provide that under certain
circumstances controlling persons may be held liable for the unlawful
52. 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 1973).
53. 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973).
54. See City Nat'1 Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir.
1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
55. Ruder, supra note 2, at 630-38. But see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 231 BNA
SR & LR E-1 (Dec. 12, 1973), in which the court held that m an action for injunctive
relief an individual can be enjoined as an aider or abettor without proof of scienter
if he has been negligent.
56. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Securities Act]. Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o, provides: Every person who, by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection
with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k [Secun-
ties Act § 11] or 771 [Securities Act § 12], shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or rea-
sonable ground to believe m the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist."
57. See note 11 supra, for text of Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a)
(1970).
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activities of persons under their control. It is useful at the outset to
consider under what circumstances courts have regarded directors as
controlling persons within the meaning of these sections.
58
At least one court seems to have assumed that a director is by
definition a person in control of corporate employees within the mean-
ing of section 20(a). In Moerman v. Zipco, Inc.,"9 the plaintiff brought
an action against the issuers and its directors for rescission under sec-
tion 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities Act60 and for damages under
Rule lOb-5 and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act 6' The plaintiff
alleged that the president of the corporation had induced him to purchase
shares through misrepresentation of material facts. While the court
found that the plaintiff had no significant contact with any of the di-
rectors, it observed that the directors had participated in corporate af-
fairs by raising a substantial portion of the initial capital, by represent-
ing a large portion of the total shares on the board, by signing board
meeting minutes, by participating in meetings, and by signing a Form
S-1 registration statement filed with the SEC.6" Based on these obser-
vations, the court stated:
The conclusion is inescapable that persons who act as directors are
in control of the corporation. This is especially true in light of
the liberal construction of this section [Section 20(a) of the Ex-
change Act] as including "indirect means of discipline or influence
short of actual direction." 68
The strict Zipco approach was regarded as "persuasive "64 by the
district court in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,65 a case growing out of the
now famous BarChris06 litigation. However, the court refrained from
taking a position since the director in question was found to have
shown "good faith."'6 7  On the other hand, the court in Mader v. Ar-
mel,66 held that whether or not a director is a "control person" within
the meaning of section 20(a) of the Exchange Act is essentially a
58. See note 12 supra.
59. 302 F Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mem., 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.
1970).
60. Securities Act § 12(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. H9 771(l)-(2) (1970).
61. Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
62. 302 F Supp. at 447.
63. Id., quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
64. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP., 92,826, at 90,829, 90,104 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
65. Id. at 90,829.
66. Escott v. Barchns Constr. Corp., 283 F Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
67. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,829, 90,104 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
68. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,027, at 90,787,
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question of fact. The court suggested that directors may be controlling
persons with respect to the acts of codirectors and executive officers
without being in control of the extra-corporate conduct of other em-
ployees. 69
In addition, the Mader court regarded the Zipco holding, cou-
pled with the tendency of some courts to ground lOb-5 liability upon
a showing of negligence, as "frightening."' °  It was not prepared to
hold an outside director, not exercising practical control or influence
over the other corporate directors or officers, liable "simply by virtue
of the fact that he was a director."'"
Thus, the question of whether a director is or is not a controlling
person, absent some showing of actual participation in the unlawful
transaction or practical control over corporate affairs, remains unre-
solved.
Both section 15 of the Securities Act and section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act provide a defense for controlling persons who are found
to have acted in good faith. Most reported cases involving a con-
sideration of the good faith defense under these sections have dealt
with the responsibility of brokerage houses for acts of their registered
representatives. 72  The district court in Hecht v Harris, Upham & Co.,73
for example, observed that with respect to section 20(a) of the Ex-
change Act:
It has been held that absent a showing by the controlling person
that it acted in good faith, the controlling person is liable and,
further, that to satisfy the requirement of good faith it is necessary
to show that precautionary measures were taken to prevent the
violation and, further, that failure of the controlling person to main-
tain and diligently enforce a proper system of internal supervision
and control constitutes participation in the misconduct and the vio-
lation will be deemed to have been committed, not only by the
controlled person, but also by the controlling person who did not
perform the duty to prevent it.7
4
90,797 (S.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023
(1972).
69. Id. at 90,797-98.
70. Id. at 90,798.
71. 1.1.
72. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970);
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Lorenz v. Watson,
258 F Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,621, at 95,319 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968);
Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F Supp. 453 (E.D.NY 1968)
73. 283 F Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
74. Id. at 438. It is interesting to note that the court also observed that "[tihe
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It has also been held that directors cannot be expected to exercise
the kind of supervision over corporate employees that brokers must
exercise over salesmen.75 While no reported case has held that di-
rectors may establish good faith and avoid liability merely by dele-
gating the duty of supervision or relying on independent consultants,
reliance by a director upon independent consultants in evaluating his
officers' conduct would tend to establish the director's "good faith" for
purposes of the defense under section 20(a). In interpreting this "good
faith" defense, the court in Mader v. Armel 7 held that, while the burden
of showing good faith is placed on the controlling person,77 "The op-
posite of good faith is 'bad faith.' Bad faith certainly implies some-
thing more than negligence.
78
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.70 has held
recently that the intent of the defense found in section 15 of the Securi-
ties Act is to insulate control persons from liability except in instances
where "control is effectively exercised to bring about the action upon
which liability is based."8" In addition, the court stated that liability
under section 20 of the Exchange Act must be predicated upon a show-
ing that the director was "in the fraud perpetrated by controlled per-
sons." '  Negligent conduct is not, according to the court, actionable
"culpability" under section 20 of the Exchange Act.82
Director Responsibility for Aiding and Abetting
Violations of the Securities Laws
Increasingly, plaintiffs have sought to overcome the defenses avail-
able under the controlling persons liability provisions of the Securities
general principle of internal supervision and control m the brokerage business is re-
flected in numerous publications of the American Association of Stock Exchange Firms
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, in both of which organization
Harris, Upham held membership." Id. See NYSE Manual, supra note 5, at A-24 to 27,
where certain precautions against unlawful insider trading are suggested to listed
companies.
75. Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), afjd mere.,
422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
76. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RnP. 93,027, at 90,797
(S.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
The director relied on reports of certified public accountants of good reputation.
77 Id. at 90,798-99.
78. Id. at 90,798. See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. U 92,826, at 90,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where the district court
held that the fact that a director was deceived by culpable members of the board, and
had therefore no knowledge of the fraud, tended to establish "good faith."
79. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 1298.
81. Id. at 1299.
82. Id.
and the Exchange Acts83 by advancing the common law tort theory
of aiding and abetting.8 4  The most notable success to date occurred
in the case of Brennan v Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.85
The district court held that the defendant corporation, by its affirmative
conduct,86 had aided and abetted the fraudulent activities of a securi-
ties broker dealing in the corporation's stock. Specifically, the court
found that failure by Midwestern to take remedial action before the
Indiana Securities Commission, in spite of an earlier request by the
Commission to report further irregularities and in spite of an earlier
warning to the offending broker that Midwestern intended to go to
the Commission, enabled the broker to continue in his fraudulent
scheme. The corporation thereby implicitly encouraged the scheme
by indicating that Midwestern would not report the broker's activities.
8 7
The court further found that Midwestern allowed the fraudulent
conduct to continue in order to avoid public disclosure that there had
been irregular trading activities in its stock since negotiations were un-
der way to merge the corporation with, at various times, two other
corporations. 88  The court relied on the formulation of aiding and
abetting set forth in the Restatement of Torts:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another, [a] person is liable if he
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so
to conduct himself.
89
The ramifications of Brennan and earlier aiding and abetting
cases9 ° with respect to director liability for insider trading are far from
clear. In Brennan the court found that the corporation tacitly encour-
aged the illicit scheme in order to avoid any decline in the price of
its shares and possibly to effect an increase in price. 91 In most situa-
83. See generally Ruder, supra note 2, at 605-08.
84. See id. at 609-10, 620-38. The related doctrine of conspiracy has not yet
been meaningfully differentiated from aiding and abetting by courts seeking to impose
civil liability upon corporations or their directors arising out of trading violations by
others. Id. at 639-41.
85. 286 F Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), ajj'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
86. 286 F Supp. at 704.
87 Ia. at 726-27
88. Id. at 719.
89. Id. at 708, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965).
90. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y 1963).
The SEC has long enlisted the aider and abettor concept in enforcement proceedings.
See cases collected in Ruder, supra note 2, at 625 n. 124.
91. The broker, Dobich, was involved in the purchase of large blocks of Mid-
western shares for resale to his customers and had represented to Midwestern that
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tions involving insider trading the corporation would seem to have little
business interest in assisting insiders in securities law violations.
92
Moreover, the court emphasized that the corporation had, by its affir-
mative encouragement of the broker, entered the realm of unlawful
aiding and abetting.9 3  At least two courts have stated, however, that
an aider and abettor cause of action may be predicated upon encour-
agement through silence or inaction.94
Thus, Brennan may be said to stand for the proposition that
where a person knows of and is able to take corrective action with
respect to unlawful activity and the offender knows that no corrective
action will be taken, the offender is being tacitly encouraged to con-
tinue and is therefore being aided and abetted. With respect to insider
trading, if the directors are aware of such improper conduct and fail
to take corrective measures, they presumably would be exposed to
claims on the basis of common law neglect of duty95 and would be
unable to carry their burden of showing good faith in defense of a
claim of liability as controlling persons. On the other hand, if the
insider is successful in keeping his conduct secret, it is difficult to ima-
gme even the Brennan court finding that he was aided and abetted by
the directors.
Brennan holds one lesson which has specific relevance to the
formulation and implementation of preventative programs: any pro-
they would appreciate in value as a result of his activities. 286 F Supp. at 708. Mid-
western, in the meantime, was negotiating a merger with another insurance company,
the terms of which were a function or relative market prices of the securities of the two
companies. It was to Midwesten's advantage, therefore, to augment the market
value of Midwestern shares. Id. at 724.
92. The court in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910,
912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 82 (1969), observed that "insider" trading when revealed,
derogates from the prestige and good will of the corporation. But cf. Richardson v.
MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971).
93. 286 F Supp. at 728.
94. Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
In Anderson, however, it was alleged that the defendant aided and abetted the person
conducting the unlawful activity by providing office space, endorsing his skill and
standing as a commodities trader and holding him out as a valued customer. Id. at 709.
It also appears that duPont may have benefited, at least marginally, from its business
relationship with the commodities trader. See id. at 707 In spite of the court's
language to the contrary, it is doubtful that that case could forcefully be cited for
the proposition that mere failure to disclose an unlawful scheme constitutes aiding and
abetting. In Strong v. France the court stated that silence or inaction will give rise to
liability "only when a duty to disclose has arisen." 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dictum).
95. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969). The duty, would be the failure of the directors to curtail the improper use
of a corporate asset.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
gram which is adopted should be effectively enforced. Midwestern
had informed the broker that his activites would be reported to the
Indiana Securities Commission in the event Midwestern received fur-
ther complaints from his customers,9 6 but later implicitly retracted its
threat to report this conduct. The court found that this served to en-
courage the continued illegal activity 97 By similar analysis, a court
might reason that a weak and ineffective supervisory program or a
strict program which is not enforced could have the effect of encour-
aging improper trading by demonstrating that mangement was not sen-
ously concerned about such conduct. 98
Criteria for Evaluating Preventative Programs
In order to evaluate alternative preventative measures, criteria
should be established for judging each particular program. Although
the relative importance of criteria for evaluation will vary from com-
pany to company, the following questions would appear to be relevant
in most situations:
1. What conduct is the program designed to prevent? In order
to answer this question a decision is necessary as to the purpose
of the program. If the program is to prevent unintentional violations
arising out of an insufficient knowledge of the securities laws, its edu-
cational aspects will be most relevant. On the other hand, if the pro-
gram is to prevent intentional misconduct, its ability to expose viola-
tions of the securities laws and to deter attempted concealments of
such violations will be more relevant.
2. Will the program be an effective means of preventing the
proscribed conduct? When dealing with programs which are primar-
ily educational, the answer to this question will depend on how clearly
the information is communicated to employees. The possibility that
employees will misinterpret what they are told must be considered, as
must be the possibility of extension of the program's education aspects to
96. 286 F Supp. at 711.
97 The court said: "The significance of MULIC's practice was not that it pre-
vented Dobich customers from complaining to the Indiana Securities Commission.
The significance of MULIC's practice was that it indicated to Dobich that MULIC
would not, as it had previously threatened, itself report Dobich's activities." Id. at 723.
98. Of course, it also must be shown that the persons assisting the unlawful
conduct have at least some general awareness that they are somehow assisting improper
conduct. See text accompanying notes 34-48 supra; SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins.
Co., 324 F Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), ajj'd mere., 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971);
Ruder, supra note 2, at 630-38. Cf. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., note 55 supra, in which
the court considered negligent failure to obtain the information which would have re-
sulted in such awareness to be sufficient where only injunctive relieve was sought.
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lower level employees who may have difficulty understanding what they
are being told. If the function of the program is to prevent intentional
misconduct, the ease with which the program may be circumvented
must be considered. For example, policy statements against disclosure of
confidential information, perhaps effective in preventing unintentional
misconduct, will be ineffective in preventing the intentional disclosure
of inside information to outsiders.
3. What alternative measures are capable of preventing the same
conduct? This question is predicated on the assumption that if several
preventative programs will accomplish the same results, the most desir-
able program is that which accomplishes its goals with the least restric-
tion of an employee's freedom.
4. What effect will the program have on employee morale? In
most companies employee morale is important and would be adversely
affected by programs which give the employee the impression that he
is not trusted or that his intelligence or integrity is not respected by
his employer. For this reason, even the most innocuous preventative
program must be communicated to employees tactfully with an assur-
ance that it is not a reflection on any particular employee or group of
employees. Consideration of employee morale also requires an analy-
sis of the interrelationship between the preventative program and the
company's stock option, stock purchase and other benefit plans.
5. What will the program cost to implement? Cost may be
measured in a variety of ways. Actual out-of-pocket costs in terms
of communications to employees and additional paperwork and per-
sonnel are relatively easy to compute. The cost in terms of the de-
mands of the program on the time and energies of key executives is
more difficult to ascertain. Thus, a preventative program which re-
quires frequent exercise of judgment at a relatively senior level is gen-
erally less desirable than a program providing for clear restrictions and
relatively few possible exceptions.
The nature of the judgment which must be exercised should also
be considered. It is frequently easier to ascertain whether a particular
fact is "generally known in the investment community" than it is to
determine whether a fact is "material." The former question can
be resolved at a lower level within the corporate structure than the
latter question, the resolution of which requires a greater overall under-
standing of the corporation's activities.
6. What administrative problems are involved in implementing
and enforcing the program? This question requires an analysis of the
program to determine its feasibility. The ease with which a program
may be implemented and enforced without the necessity of numerous
exceptions for types of conduct or classes of employees is an essential
administrative consideration. Similarly, the ease with which the pro-
gram may be kept operational despite turnover either among those per-
sons administering the program or among the employees subject to
it must be considered.
7 Can the program be enforced in an effective manner9  No
program should be implemented without a realization that violations
may occur and that the violator may be a key executive whose con-
tinued loyalty is important to the corporation. Previolation enforce-
ment techniques which may be applied across the board without regard
to the status of the employee, such as stop-transfer orders, restrictive
legends and similar preventative techniques, are relatively simple to
implement.
The enforcement of the program becomes more difficult, however,
when the question of imposing appropriate sanctions does not arise
until after the improper conduct has occurred. An effective program
should provide appropriate sanctions for violations without undue pub-
licity and without increasing the risk of subsequent shareholder attack.
The possibility should be considered of providing for sanctions of various
degrees of severity and of forewarning employees that such sanctions
may be imposed. The risk that a key employee will intentionally violate
a prohibition against insider trading is greater if he believes the corpo-
ration's only choices are to ignore the transaction or discharge him than
when public admonishment for the conduct and disgorgement of his
profits are available alternatives.
8. Will the program be understood and followed? No program
will be effective unless it is understood by the persons subject to it.
Legalisms and ambiguous terms should be avoided. It is frequently
desirable to elicit comments on the program from several of the em-
ployees subject to it and to modify it on the basis of these comments
prior to broad dissemination. Programs which are likely to be misin-
terpreted or which would lend themselves to inadvertent or economi-
cally pressured violations are generally unsatisfactory For example,
in corporations where a substantial portion of the net worth of many
employees is invested in the employer's securities, it is generally not
realistic to prohibit the employees from borrowing money secured by
those securities.
9 To what extent can employees subject to the program be ex-
pected to commit the violations proscribed by it? Once the decision
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is made to implement a particular preventative program, the question
of who should be subject to it must be considered. Certain programs
are only relevant to highly paid employees. Consequently, the admin-
istrative difficulty of implementing them with respect to lesser paid
employees must be weighed against the likelihood that such employees
would engage in the prohibited conduct. For example, a clerical em-
ployee is not only unlikely to engage in puts, calls or straddles, but
the problem of explaining their prohibition to him may be insurmount-
able.
Analysis of Particular Preventative Programs
Although the number and variety of possible programs designed
to prevent improper transactions in the employer's securities are unlim-
ited, the following types of programs are most frequently coinsidered.
These programs are not mutually exclusive and in some cases they
overlap. Thus, the decision to implement a particular preventative
program must take into account the impact of other preventative pro-
grams which the corporation also intends to implement.
Programs Designed to Discourage Recommendations or
Expressions of Opinion as to the Desirability of
Purchasing or Selling Company Securities
Recommendations and opinions concerning an employer's securi-
ties are frequently solicited informally by friends and acquaintances
of corporate employees. In many cases the employee is not in a posi-
tion to express an informed opinion. The board of directors should
consider establishing a policy against the expression of such opinions,
whether or not the employee possesses material inside information or
is capable of expressing an informed opimon as to the desirability of
investing in the company's securities. This policy, together with an
explanation of why it is in the best interest of the employee and the
corporation, should be widely publicized.
Such a policy may be justified on two grounds: (1) the em-
ployee, by not having all the facts, may mislead the person seeking
information, and (2) if the employee has inside information, he will
be personally liable for transactions by his tippee. 99 Although there
is no completely effective way to enforce such a program, a high de-
99. Persons receiving inside information from insiders knowing such informa-
tion to be material and undisclosed may be held jointly and severally liable with the
insider for profits realized as a result of trades made prior to public disclosure.
See, e.g., Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Rapp & Loeb,
Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5, 7 CoRP. PRAc. COMMENT. 374 (1972).
gree of voluntary compliance by employees will result if reasons for
the program are communicated to them adequately Furthermore, the
existence of such a program will provide employees with a basis for
declining to express an opinion m circumstances under which they
would otherwise find it difficult to do so. 100
Information on which recommendations and opinions may be
based is also solicited by analysts, stockbrokers and other members
of the investment community In general, these inquiries are directed
to the corporation's financial or public relations executives. A formal-
ized procedure for dealing with these inquiries, with all responses
cleared through a single officer, will reduce the likelihood that the
members of the investment community will receive conflicting or mac-
curate information from corporate spokesmen. Moreover, the task of
policing disclosures to make sure that previously undisclosed material
information in disseminated widely rather than selectively is facilitated
by having a single officer of the corporation responsible for approving
all press releases, interviews and other responses to inquiries from the
investment community
Prohibition Against Trading Activity
Although many corporations encourage employee share owner-
ship, transactions of a trading, rather than an investment, nature
cannot be justified as a part of employee participation in ownership.
Even if such transactions are not an attempt to capitalize upon inside
information, they may adversely reflect on the corporation and its man-
agement by giving the appearance of improper motivation.1"' More-
over, if the employee realizes a substantial profit in connection with
a trading transaction, it will be difficult if not impossible to convince
outsiders that he was not capitalizing on inside information.
Officers, directors and 10 percent beneficial owners are precluded
from selling short or selling "against the box" by section 16(c) of
the Exchange Act.1" 2 Their ability to utilize puts, calls or straddles
100. An appropriate answer, such as, "I believe that the long term prospects of the
Company are good, but I'm no expert in the stock market and can't predict how it will
act," may seem obvious. However, many employees would not think of it if confronted
with a question about investing in their employer's securities.
10i. Because a call "is not the vehicle an executive would normally use to invest
in his company merely because he thought it had a good long-term future" the risk that
he will have to defend a lawsuit where he purchases a call rather than the security
itself is substantially greater. Interview with Prof. Robert Mundheim, in Those Law-
suits Against Executives, 92 DuNN's R.Ev., Oct., 1968, at 51, 52. See also SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2nd Cir. 1968).
102. "It shall be unlawful for any such benficial owner, director, or officer, di-
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(which are typically purchased for periods of less than six months)
to capitalize on material inside information is negated in large measure
by section 16(b),101 which requires them to turn over to the corpora-
tion any profit realized from the purchase and sale, or sale and pur-
chase, of a registered class of equity securities within a six-month per-
iod. However, the prohibitions of section 16(b) do not apply to non-
officers1 °4 or to securities other than registered equity securities. 105
Thus, section 16(b) does not ordinarily proscribe transactions in secur-
ities by officers or directors of an affiliated corporation or a subsidi-
rectly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security), if the person selling the security or his principal (1) does not own the se-
curity sold, or (2) if owning the security, does not deliver it against such sale within
twenty days thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit it in the mails
or other usual channels of transportation; but no person shall be deemed to have vio-
lated this subsection if he proves that notwithstanding the exercise of good faith he
was unable to make such delivery or deposit within such time, or that to do so would
cause undue mconvemence or expense." Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(c) (1970).
103. "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
slhp to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, di-
rector, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or
of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover
such profit may be instituted at law or m equity in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer m the name and in
behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit
shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules
and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
104. See Lee Nat'! Corp. v. Segur, 281 F Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The
term "officer" is defined in Rule 3b-2 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2
(1973); to mean "a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any
other person who performs for an issuer . functions corresponding to those per-
formed by the foregoing offices." Thus, the title of the position is not determinative
and persons who are not technically officers of the corporation may be subject to the
proscriptions of section 16.
105. Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). "Equiity securities" are
defined to include securities convertible into or carrying any warrant or right to sub-
scribe for a registered equity security. Exchange Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(a) (1970). "Registered" includes both securities listed on a national exchange, Ex-
change Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1970), and securities registered under sec-
tion 12(g) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
ary.
106
A program designed to prevent trading activities would generally
extend prohibitions similar to those contained in section 16(b) to other
trading activities, such as the purchase of a put or a call, and to other
employees whose level of compensation and access to information may
tempt them to engage m such activities. However, exceptions should
be considered for transactions which are not prohibited by section
16(b) and which are motivated by tax considerations, such as short
sales against the box, and for transactions economically dictated by
stock option and other employee benefit plans, such as the sale of se-
curities to raise funds to exercise a stock option.
If a program designed to prevent trading activities is to be effec-
tive, it must include follow-up procedures and appropriate sanctions.
Although there is no completely effective way to determine whether
an employee has purchased or sold a put or call on the employer's
securities or if he has purchased or sold shares held in "street name,"
the transfer agent can be required to advise the employer of all trans-
actions in the employer's securities by employees subject to the pro-
hibition.
Utilization of Blackout Periods
In order to preserve secrecy, material inside information fre-
quently is not known to a number of officers and directors until the
company is in a position to issue a press release. Despite their lack
of knowledge, such key employees should not engage in securities
transactions prior to the press release, since their transactions would be
viewed with suspicion by the investment community Moreover, where
an action is brought to recover their profit, such employees may have
difficulty establishing their lack of inside information.
1°7
The risk of such unfortunate coincidences may be reduced by the
utilization of a blackout period procedure. Under this program a des-
ignated official is advised whenever there is material undisclosed infor-
mation concerning the company which makes sales or purchases unde-
sirable. He then communicates the existence of a blackout period to
all officers and key employees, indicating that until further notice trans-
actions in the company's securities should not be undertaken. In order
106. But see Lee Natl Corp. v. Segur, 281 F Supp. 851, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(court suggested that an officer of a subsidiary of the issuer might be regarded as an
"officer" of the issuer if he performs the functions of an officer of the issuer.)
107 See, e.g., Investors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD.
SEC. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,956-57, a!fd, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July
29, 1971).
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to reduce the likelihood that transactions will be motivated by the an-
nouncement regarding the blackout period, the announcement should
indicate that neither purchases nor sales should be made. This will
help conceal the favorableness or unfavorableness of the inside infor-
mation.
The primary advantage of the blackout period procedure is its
ability to prevent transactions which appear to be, but are not, im-
proper. However, at times when no blackout period is in effect, such
a procedure may be viewed as implying that there is no material undis-
closed information. Thus, blackout period procedures have been criti-
cized on the basis that they require the corporation to determine con-
tinuously whether undisclosed information is, in fact, material.
Arbitrary Limitation of Securities Transactions to Specified Periods
A number of programs are designed to prevent all securities trans-
actions during periods when material undisclosed information is likely
to exist. These programs offer the advantage of providing arbitrary
restrictions which are not geared to the existence of material undis-
closed information, and which do not permit the drawing of conclusions
as to whether such information exists.
A company which decides to implement this program must ana-
lyze its business to determine those times at which material undisclosed
information is most likely to exist. Suggestions by the New York Stock
Exchange 0 8 provide a basic framework for this type of restrictive pro-
gram. The Exchange suggests that it is appropriate to buy or sell
securities for a 30-day period commencing one week after the annual
report has been mailed to stockholders, provided that the annual report
adequately covers important corporate developments. The Exchange
also suggests that transactions may be appropriate following the release
of quarterly results if no important undisclosed developments are pend-
ing, or following the wide dissemination of information on the current
status of the company, such as the distribution of a proxy statement
or a prospectus. Likewise, trading could be permitted when there is
relative stability in the company's operations and the market for its
securities, such as periods of historic mactivity in seasonal businesses.
Permitting insiders to engage in transactions during periods fol-
lowing dissemination of an annual report or earnings statement in-
creases the burden on the corporation to include all material informa-
tion in the publication relied on to inform the public of the corpora-
108. NYSE Manual, supra note 5, § A2, at A-25 to 26.
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tion's affairs. Annual reports to shareholders have historically at-
tempted to portray the corporation m the most favorable light, em-
phasizing those factors which are positive and minimizing those con-
siderations which are negative. 1oa Substantial sales by insiders follow-
ing the publication of such an annual report may well result in pur-
chasers of securities basing a Rule 10b-5 action against the corporation
on the report's content.
Similarly, it is risky to assume that adequate information is avail-
able to the public because a quarterly report has been dissemnnated,
since a quarterly report generally does not discuss the business of the
company The allegation could be made that publication of the quar-
terly results, lacking comment on pertinent investment factors, pro-
duces a misleading report violative of Rule 10b-5 "I Finally, because
of the time spent preparing and disseminating the typical annual report,
it may not contain the most currently available information. Unlike
a proxy statement or prospectus, the annual report frequently restricts
its comments to results of the prior year, which may have ended three
or four months before its dissemination.
Arbitrary Limtation of Securities Transactions
to a Predetermined Pattern
Arbitrary restrictions requiring an employee to determine in ad-
vance what transactions he will pursue may justify purchases or sales
during the existence of material undisclosed information. Such would
be the case if the employee can prove that he was irrevocably com-
mitted to purchase or sell before the facts giving rise to such material
undisclosed information arose. For example, purchases may be per-
mtted pursuant to a periodic investment program and purchases or
sales may be permitted under an established program administered by
a broker where the timing of the transactions is outside the control
of the individual. However, such programs are inherently inflexible
and fail to take into account the individual financial needs of the em-
108a. The SEC recently proposed rule changes which would require the annual
report to stockholders to contain much of the information presently required by
Form 10-K. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10591 (Jan. 10, 1974). If
these changes are adopted, it is likely that the annual report will be regarded more
as a disclosure document requiring a balanced presentation than as a shareholders' pub-
lic relations vehicle.
109. Moreover, if adjustments are made in the results for the entire year which
might have appropnately been reflected in the intenm report, liability may arise under
Rule iOb-5 unless the issuer can sustain the burden of going forward with evidence
demonstrating that the accounting treatment in the interim report was correct. Repub-
lic Technology Fund, Inc. v. The Lionel Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP 94,069, at 94,303 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ployee who, because of unforeseen personal circumstances, may find
it necessary to engage in transactions which cannot be preprogrammed.
Furthermore, such programs are suitable only for the implementation
of long-term decisions to purchase or sell. Thus, the employee is de-
nied the right to dispose of his entire position in the company even
though he has no inside information.
Prohibition Against Transactions in Securities of Affiliates, Customers,
Suppliers and Other Parties with whom the Employer
is Negotiating or Dealing
Recent proceedings have indicated that the class of persons who
are precluded from acting on undisclosed material information may be
substantially expanded. Although early "tippee" cases indicated that the
material information must be obtained pursuant to a confidential rela-
tionsip creating a direct fiduciary obligation,1 ' recent administrative
decisions by the Securities and Exchange Commission have expanded
the "tippee" concept to include persons who bear no such fiduciary
relationship to the issuer."" Further expansion of this concept to
preclude transactions by persons who not only lack a fiduciary re-
lationship to the issuer but who obtain such information from sources
which have no fiduciary relationship to the issuer is a distinct possibility
in light of recent actions involving pre-press release trading in shares
of Equity Funding."' Accordingly, adoption of a policy precluding
insiders from purchasing or selling securities of suppliers, customers
and other parties with whom the employer is negotiating should be
considered.
110. See note 30 supra.
111. E.g., Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25,
1973); In re Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267
(July 29, 1971).
112. In a disciplinary proceeding growing out of the collapse of Equity Funding,
the New York Stock Exchange charged Raymond L. Dirks with violating Section 10 of
the Exchange Act by "tipping" clients between March 6 and March 26, 1973. The
"material inside information" which Mr. Dirks was charged with improperly disclos-
ing was not alleged to have been obtained from or as a result of any relationship with
the Company or its officials, but resulted from Mr. Dirks' own investigation of a
charge made by a former employee of Equity Funding. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No.
198, at A-2 (April 18, 1973). Purchasers from Mr. Dirks' "tippees" have also sought
to recover on the theory that the information relied on by the sellers was material in-
side information which could not be acted upon, notwithstanding the absence of any
confidential relationship between Equity Funding and Mr. Dirks. Salomon Bros. v. John
W Bristol & Co., Inc. (S.D.N.Y. filed April 11, 1973), in BNA SEc. REG. & L. RuP.
No. 199, at A-2 (April 25, 1973). Referring to the Equity Funding case as "a law
professor's dream," the Wall Street Journal was impelled to ask "Is Everybody an
Insider?" Goldstein, Equity Funding Case Raises Many Legal Questions About Inside
Information but Yields Few Answers, Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1973, at 30, col. 1.
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If such a program is implemented, care must be taken in deter-
mining what companies are initially placed on the restricted list and
how changes are made. For example, the mere addition to the restricted
list of a company with which confidential negotiations are in pro-
gress may itself be a material disclosure to persons bent on profiting
from such transactions. Although an insider may be unaware of a
material pending transaction with another corporation at the time
of his purchase or sale, he will have difficulty so convincing the
marketplace. The arbitrary prohibition of transactions in securities
of compames with which the employer is dealing eliminates both the
existence and the apparent existence of wrongdoing.
Prohibition Against Ownership of Securities of Nonpublic
Affiliates, Suppliers, Customers and Competitors
Although this prohibition is frequently discussed in connection
with the consideration of programs to prevent insider trading, its pur-
pose is entirely different. Prohibiting employees from investing in non-
public affiliates is predicated upon the absence of an established market
price for the affiliates' securities and the desire to preclude any relation-
ship which creates or appears to create a conflict in interest which
might affect the employee's performance of his duties.
Although not articulated in the requirements for listing on the
New York Stock Exchange, there has long been a policy of discourag-
ing officers of listed compames from engaging in transactions with or
having a minority interest in, affiliates and subsidiaries. The Exchange
has also taken into account the interests of directors, officers and pnn-
cipal shareholders in subsidiaries, competitors, suppliers and customers
in determining whether a listing application should be favorably con-
sidered.' 13  The prohibition against investments in nonpublicly held
customers or suppliers is also predicated upon the existence of a fidu-
ciary obligation to the employer corporation.
Pretransaction Notification or Clearance Programs
The pretransaction notification or clearance procedure is designed
to prevent transactions when material undisclosed information exists,
whether or not such information is known to the officer, director or
key employee who proposes to enter into the transaction. It is predi-
cated on the assumption that employees subject to obtaining pretrans-
action clearance may not be able to establish that they were unaware
of such information.
113. NYSE Manual, supra note 5, § B-1 at B-5.
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Pretransaction clearance programs assume that material inside in-
formation can exist at any time and that, therefore, arbitrary blackout
periods are not feasible. All subject employees are required to notify
a designated officer of the corporation prior to engaging in any pur-
chase or sale of the employer's securities. Under the notification pro-
cedure if the employee is not advised to forego the transaction within
a specified period, he is free to enter into it. Under a clearance proce-
dure he must await advice from the designated officer prior to engaging
in the transaction.
One basic objection to the pretransaction notification or clearance
procedure is that at times a corporate officer has difficulty keeping
abreast of all material undisclosed information. To place such a bur-
den on any officer involves the corporation to a degree which may
subject it to liability as an aider or abettor of any improper transaction.
Another objection to the pretransaction procedure is that, in spite of
its effectiveness, the establishment of communication channels for the
effective and expeditious operation of the program may involve the
expenditure of substantial administrative time and expense. The act
of advising an employee not to engage in a transaction is likely to
create rumors which may actually motivate employees to enter into
such transactions. However, if the same advice is given every time
material insider information exists, whether favorable or unfavorable,
the action of the clearance officer would not be considered an indi-
cation that prices for the security would be expected to increase rather
than decrease. Therefore, it is unlikely that the advice itself would
provide a basis for action.
Posttransaction Notification as a Preventative Device
An alternate to pretransaction notification is posttransaction noti-
fication, that is, a requirement that all persons report all transactions
in the issuer's securities after they have been made. If an employee
knows that his transaction must be brought to the attention of cor-
porate officials in a position to investigate it, he may be less likely
to enter into a transaction when he possesses material inside informa-
tion.
The primary advantages of this procedure over pretransaction no-
tification are greater simplicity, avoidance of delay by the employee
in effecting transactions, allowance of innocent transactions which might
be barred under a pretransaction procedure and elimination of a
clearance officer whose actions would indicate the existence or non-
existence of material undisclosed information. A primary disadvantage
to this procedure is its inability to prevent inadvertent improper trans-
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actions. The employer is put on notice of such a transaction at a
time when the only sanctions available are those more severe than merely
advising the employee not to enter into the transaction. Furthermore,
posttransaction notification would not prevent the company from being
charged with failure to take adequate steps to prevent improper trans-
actions before they occurred.
Restrictions on Extensions of Credit in
Connection with Purchase of Securities
Notwithstanding policies favoring a meaningful investment by
management in the equity securities of the employer, 1 4 the company
may consider restricting the use of credit in connection with the acqui-
sition of the employer's securities"15 and discouraging a disproportion-
ate commitment of the employee's personal wealth to those securities.
Such policies are predicated on the assumption that an employee who
has incurred substantial indebtedness in connection with the purchase
of his employer's securities is more likely to act on the basis of inside
information, particularly where such information is likely to result in
the market price dropping below the level at which his loan would
be called or additional collateral would be required.
Although a corporation may decide to limit a stock option grant
to that which the employee can afford without incurring substantial
personal debt,"' no effective procedure exists for imposing sanctions
on those employees who incur excessive personal debt. Moreover, many
corporations prefer to have key employees with an inordinate commit-
ment to the employer's securities, on the theory that such employees
are less likely to seek other employment or work against the employer's
interests. Finally, this policy is the most subject to the criticism that it
interferes with the employee's personal affairs. The effective imple-
mentation of such a credit restriction program necessarily would require
a knowledge of the employee's overall financial condition.
114. E.g. id. § A2, at A-24.
115. This policy must be differentiated from that reflected by statutes which re-
strict the ability of the corporation to make loans or guarantee obligations of officers
or directors or of any person on the security of shares of the corporation, such as
CAL. CORP. CODE § 823 (West Supp. 1973), which are intended to prevent insiders
from taking advantage of their position. See Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 878,
151 P.2d 841 (1944) (involving prior version of CAL. CORP CODE § 823 (West Supp.
1973) ).
116. An alternative to incurring debt in order to exercise options is selling securi-
ties purchased through prior stock option exercises in order to finance the purchase
of subsequent installments. In addition to the risk that officers will inadvertently en-
gage in a transaction proscribed by Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, this practice
dilutes the officer's interest in the company's securities and the incentive value of the
option.
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Restrictions on Stock Option Grant Procedures
Even where no preventhtive program is implemented for purposes
of regulating the timing of purchases and sales by employees, a cor-
poration should consider the desirability of taking steps to assure that
no stock option will be granted at a time when material inside informa-
tion exists. If the information is adverse and the market price of the
security drops after the option is granted, the value of the option and
the incentive produced by it will be substantially reduced. If the in-
formation is favorable, the grant of the option may be criticized on
the same philosophy that relates to purchases and sales by insiders.
117
Moreover, if the employee is aware of the material inside information
at the time he accepts the option, he may have to disclose such infor-
mation to the option committee or risk the rescission of the option
under Rule 10b-5.118
Restrictions of Purchases and Sales to Normal Broker's Transactions
Transactions in an employer's securities which do not occur in
normal broker's transactions may create the appearance of improper
conduct, even if completely proper. Included in such transactions are
private purchases or sales at other than the existing market price, pur-
chases in connection with the public offering of a new issue and pur-
chases at the time of the employer's imtial public offering.
If transactions between insiders and customers or suppliers of the
corporation occur at prices other than those prevailing in the regular
market, they may constitute a form of benefit or compensation designed
to encourage favorable treatment.
The purchase of securities in connection with a public offering
by company personnel involved in the registration process, particularly
those who participate in the pricing of new securities issues, may also
be restricted. The basic concern motivating these restrictions is not
that the employee will have the advantage of undisclosed material in-
formation, since the prospectus should contain all such information,
but that such employees will be improperly influenced in their decision
117. NYSE Manual, supra note 5, § A2, at A-26.
118. In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, it was held that a member of top manage-
ment was required before accepting a stock option to disclose material inside reforma-
tion. 410 F.2d 833, at 856 n.24. The district court had held that optionees who were
not members of top management could reasonably assume that their superiors would
disclose any material inside information to the Stock Option Committee, if required.
258 F Supp. at 291. Since the SEC did not appeal this holding, the appellate court
was not confronted with the issue of whether acceptance of option grants by them vio-
lated Rule 10b-5. 401 F.2d at 856.
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on pricing the issue by the benefit which they may gain through their
personal investment.
Often compames which have not previously had a public market
request that the managing underwriter reserve shares for or direct
shares to key employees, customers and suppliers. 119 Frequently a
chief executive's allocation of shares in an offering which he believes
will be a "hot issue," adversely affects company morale. If the offer-
ing is, in fact, a hot issue, those employees not allocated shares or
those financially unable to purchase them will be dissatisfied. On the
other hand, if the market price of the securities falls below the imtial
public offering price, 2 ' those employees who did purchase them will
be dissatisfied. Because it is frequently assumed that hot issues will not
remain hot, insiders purchasing these securities tend to dipose of them
rapidly in the after market. This has an adverse affect on the stability
of the market for the corporation's securities. If the purpose of directing
shares is to encourage greater employee participation, a better means
of accomplishing this is through employee stock purchase programs
designed for long-term commitments to the issuer's securities rather
than for trading profits.
Adoption and Promulgation of Policy Statements
Reflecting the Board's Concepts of Ethical Conduct
It is generally assumed that key employees are honest and ethical
and would not intentionally engage in transactions which they believe
to be improper. Thus, the mere promulgation of policy statements
indicating the impropriety of trading on material inside information
may be sufficient to discourage this practice. Particularly in compames
where key employees may be unaware of their potential liability for
trading on inside information, education of key employees as to their
responsibilities under the securities laws is desirable.
Alternative Means of Implementing
Preventative Programs
Once a corporation has decided which preventative programs to
119. The reservation of shares must be disclosed on the cover of the prospectus, on
the theory that the failure to do so will give a false impression of the number of shares
actually available for the public. See also, NASD Interpretation of Board of Gover-
nors, adopted November 1, 1970, CCH NASD MANUAL 2151, at 2039-42 (Nov.
1970), 2043-45 (May 1972).
120. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuTrrmns MARKETS pt. I, at 487, 516-59
(1963).
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implement, it must determine who will implement them. Three basic
alternatives exist. First, implementation may be assigned to an existing
department. If the corporation is relatively small or if the preventative
programs adopted are relatively simple, this may be done without a
substantial increase in corporate personnel and without the administra-
tive difficulty inherent in establishing new channels of communication.
Second, where the preventative programs introduced are compli-
cated in nature or would require the addition of substantial personnel,
use of compliance officers or of a compliance department not involved
in other corporate activities may be desirable. Even where compliance
activities may be absorbed into an existing department, it is sometimes
desirable to assign them to a separate department which does not have
other corporate responsibilities. This will minimize the impact of com-
pliance decisions on other relationships within the corporation.
A third alternative, the utilization of a nonmanagement staff di-
rectly responsible to the board of directors, separates the operation of
the corporation from enforcement of insider trading policies to an even
greater degree. In advocating the creation of a directors' staff, Arthur
J. Goldberg12 1 has argued forcefully that a large company's board of
directors does not have the ability to gather and analyze that informa-
tion necesary to control and manage the company Noting the respon-
sibility of the board of directors under Rule lOb-5 and under state law,
Mr. Goldberg has urged the formation of a "Committee of Overseers,"
separate from the executive committee, empowered to hire a small staff
of experts responsible only to the board.' 22
The independent staff concept may be criticized because of its
potential as a divisive force in the corporation, undercutting manage-
ment's authority and ability to act effectively It may also be criticized
as creating an unwieldy separation of powers tending to dilute the di-
rect responsibility of senior management to manage the affairs of
the corporation. Where a legitimate question exists as to whether
undisclosed information is material, management may be better able
to answer it than an independent staff. In the event of a disagreement
between the management and the independent staff as to whether infor-
mation is material, resolution of the conflict would be exceedingly diffi-
cult and might have a demoralizing effect on management.




While few courts have either rejected the necessity or denounced
the desirability of implementing programs designed to curtail im-
proper securities transactions by corporate employees, neither the
courts nor the SEC presently requires the adoption of such proce-
dures.' 23  To conclude that a duty exists to adopt such programs
where evidence of improper employee transactions is nonexistent would
not only be contrary to the presumption of employee honesty on which
the board is entitled to rely, but would extend concepts of indirect
liability for a failure to act beyond all prior limits.
However, reasons unrelated to potential liability of the directors
may justify the adoption of preventative programs. In the event cor-
porate insiders engage in improper trading, directors may be forced
to defend against claims of negligent failure to prevent the misuse of
corporate assets, of complicity as controlling persons m violations of
securities laws, and of maction tantamount to aiding and abetting the
violation of securities laws. It is reasonable to predict that the imple-
mentation and enforcement of programs would be extremely effective
if not dispositive in meeting allegations of lack of due care, lack of
good faith or lack of affirmative action.
123. Although it has been suggested that the SEC should establish standards for
director conduct which would include a duty to take appropriate action to prevent
violations from occurring, address by SEC Chairman Cook, Southern Methodist Umv.
School of Business Administration, April 6, 1973, the current chairman of the SEC
has expressed doubts that the Commission could or should establish standards for di-
rector conduct. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 17, 1973, at 24, col. 1.
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